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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J. KENNETH DAVIES and JOSEPH ) 
T. DAVIES, ) 
' ) 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, ) 
• ) • 
-vs- ) 
) Case No. 14049 
VIVIAN M. BEZZANT and EVA JEAN ) 
CORNWELL, ) 
> ' 
Defendants and Appellants. ) 
• ) : . ' . / • . • . , •' 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appellants respectfully request the Court to recall 
the decision filed herein on November 5, 1975, and to recon-
sider this case in its entirety for the following reasons: 
'••
 z 
THE DECISION APPEARS TO CONTAIN A PATENT CONTRADICTION ON ITS 
FACE. 
- . - • • • • • . • • • • • : • > ; • " • • • : - • • . • • ' . • • . • - ' I I . . ; . • ; ' " • • = . ' • • • - o V - \ . : ; • • • • • • ' . ; • . , : : • / . • ; ' . • • 
THE DECISION UPHOLDS A BASIC AND FUNDAMENTAL ERROR MADE BY THE 
TRIAL JUDGE IN THAT NOT ONLY IS THERE NO "SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE", 
BUT NO EVIDENCE AT ALL THAT DEFENDANTS' PREDECESSOR WANTED TO 
BUY ADDITIONAL GROUND, OR THAT THEY EVER AGREED WITH RESPONDENTS' 
PREDECESSOR TO PAY ANY ADDITIONAL MONEY WHATEVER. ON THE CON-
TRARY, THE RECORD SHOWS THAT THEY DID NOT AGREE TO PAY ANY MORE 
MONEY. 
• • • ' . - , . • ,•'-•" : •- ' I I I . - • ... ''- , ; 
THE DECISION DOES NOT ADEQUATELY OR FAIRLY SET FORTH UNDISPUTED 
PERTINENT FACTS NECESSARY TO A PROPER UNDERSTANDING OF THE CASE 
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IN RELATION TO THE LAW AND TO A FAIR AND PROPER ADJUDICATION 
OF THE CONTROVERSY. 
IV 
THE DECISION DOES NOT ADDRESS ITSELF TO THE BASIC LEGAL QUESTION 
PRESENTED ON THE APPEAL AND THAT IS WHETHER, AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
A CLAIM FOR A MONEY PAYMENT BY ONE PARTY, FIRST MADE ABOUT TWO 
YEARS AFTER THE FENCE WAS PLACED, RESISTED AND DENIED TO BE OWING 
BY THE OTHER, WITH THE PROBLEM UNRESOLVED AND EXTENDING OVER A 
PERIOD OF LONGER THAN TWENTY YEARS, PRECLUDES THE APPLICATION OF 
THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE. 
V 
THE DECISION APPEARS TO INTRODUCE A NEW ELEMENT INTO THE DOCTRINE 
OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE IN THAT IT RECITES THAT "THE DEFEND-
ANTS HAVE USED THE LAND IN QUESTION, BUT HAVE NEVER PAID ANY 
TAXES THEREON." THAT TAXES ARE OR MIGHT BE A PROBLEM IN BOUNDARY 
BY ACQUIESCENCE CASES HAS NEVER BEEN A FACTOR IN ANY OF THE PRIOR 
CASES. 
ALDRICH & NELSON 
By Clair M. Aldrich 
Attorneys for Appellants 
.......... ARGUMENT ..-,.... 
Points I and II will be treated together. 
^•,;,v.;,.,v.:i-:.(v-:V-.v.-.',;'..-•.•.:.• P O I N T i •;•;•. .-/•'-:-...:,•,... 
THE DECISION APPEARS TO CONTAIN A PATENT CONTRADICTION ON ITS 
FACE. 
POINT II 
THE DECISION UPHOLDS A BASIC AND FUNDAMENTAL ERROR ON THE PART 
OF THE TRIAL JUDGE IN THAT NOT ONLY IS THERE NO "SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE", BUT NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE AT ALL THAT DEFENDANTS' 
PREDECESSOR EVER WANTED TO BUY ADDITIONAL GROUND, OR THAT THEY 
EVER AGREED WITH RESPONDENTS' PREDECESSOR TO PAY FOR ANY ADDI-
TIONAL GROUND. ON THE CONTRARY, THE RECORD SHOWS THAT THEY 
DID NOT AGREE TO PAY ANY MORE MONEY. 
The last sentence of the third paragraph of the Decision 
provides: 
-2-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"The corners of the proposed purchase were staked 
out by the then respective owners, but no agreement 
was ever reached and no payment ever made for the 
desired land." (Underscoring supplied) 
Paragraph 5 of the Decision provides: 
"There was a dispute as to what was said and done at 
the time the corner stakes were set out. However, 
the trial court found that 'the fence line on the 
south and east sides of the land in dispute was 
erected pursuant to an agreement to purchase the 
land, which agreement was never performed'." 
(Underscoring supplied) 
Both of those statements cannot be correct, nor can the 
two statements be reconciled. Appellants believe that the state-
ments contradict each other. 
There was no dispute whatever as to what was said and 
done when the stakes were set for the corners of the property 
Elder was to have. Elder was the only witness that even testi-
fied as to that phase of the case. He had purchased a corner 
lot and the stakes were set so that his property abutted upon 
the west line of the street that was to have been installed• 
That there was to have been a street there is admitted by the 
respondents. (Tr. 42). Also see respondents1 Exhibit No. 5. 
The claim that there was supposed to be some kind of 
a payment for the additional ground didn't come to light until 
about two years after the boundary line had been agreed upon and 
the fence line had been erected. The witness, Mr. Neff Tippets, 
did not reside in the state at that time and did not appear in 
this matter until some time after the death of his father. The 
record does disclose that at some point after he became involved 
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in the matter the witness, Mr. Neff Tippets, did claim that there 
was money owing for the additional ground, and for an insurance 
policy. However, no agreement was ever reached as to the amount 
to be paid nor did appellants or their predecessor ever agree^ 
that any money was owing, nor did they ever agree to pay any more 
money. 
POINT III 
THE DECISION DOES NOT ADEQUATELY OR FAIRLY SET FORTH UNDISPUTED 
PERTINENT FACTS THAT ARE NECESSARY TO A PROPER UNDERSTANDING OF 
THE NATURE OF THE CASE IN RELATION TO THE LAW AND TO A FAIR AND 
PROPER ADJUDICATION OF THE CONTROVERSY. 
The following facts are not in dispute: 
1. Appellants' predecessor purchased property that was 
to be a corner lot in a proposed subdivision abutting a street 
then existing on the north and abutting a proposed street on the 
east side thereof. 
2. Early in 1950 Elder built a home on the property, 
which said home faced in an easterly direction. 
3. In the fall of 1950, Elder met on the ground with 
the then owner of the abutting property and the same person from 
whom Elder had received his deed, for the express purpose of 
locating his corners in relation to the proposed road so that 
he could fence the property that he was supposed to have acquired. 
The corners were fixed by the parties on the ground and the fence 
was erected in 1950. 
4. The senior Mr. Tippets, from whom appellants' pre-
decessor had purchased the ground and who had agreed on the 
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corners, died in late 19 51. The witness, Mr. Neff Tippets, was 
out of the state at that time and came into the picture only 
sometime after the death of his father. 
5. Mr. Neff Tippets, on several occasions until about 
1963, tried to get more money for the ground, but neither the 
appellants nor their predecessors ever agreed that any additional 
money was owing, nor did they agree to pay any additional money. 
6. The respondents acquired a deed to the property in 
196 8, but no right to possession of the land in question was ever 
asserted by the respondents or their predecessors until this 
action to quiet title was commenced in 1972. 
7. The undisputed facts in this case clearly bring the 
matter within the ambit of the Court's well established require-
ments for proof of boundary by acquiescence: 
(1) Occupation up to a visible line marked 
definitely by monuments, fences or buildings; 
(2) Acquiescence in the line as a boundary; 
(3) For a long period of years; 
(4) By adjoining owners. 
There is no contention here that the fence was built for 
some purpose other than as a boundary line. Compare Ringwood v. 
Bradford, 2 Utah(2) 119, 269 P(2) 1053, where the fence had been 
erected to control cattle. 
Here appellants' predecessor bought and respondents' 
predecessor sold him a lot that was represented to be a corner 
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lot in a proposed subdivision. On that representation a house 
was built on the lot facing easterly toward a proposed street. 
The subdivision plat had not been filed, and never was. How-
ever, the then owner of the lot met on the ground with the 
owner of the abutting ground, who was the very person from whom 
he had received his deed, and they then and there marked his 
corners to coincide with the street that was to be completed, 
and which never was installed. 
The fence was placed where it was authorized to be 
placed and the fence served as dividing and boundary line from 
1950 until this suit was filed in 1972, and during that period 
it was never questioned. 
A visible, persisting boundary existing over a long 
period of time is convincing evidence of intended or acquiescence 
in boundary. King v. Fronk, 14 Utah(2) 135, 138; 378 P(2) 893. 
POINT IV 
THE DECISION DOES NOT ADDRESS ITSELF TO THE BASIC LEGAL QUESTION 
PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND THAT IS WHETHER, AS A MATTER OF LAW, A 
CLAIM FOR A MONEY PAYMENT BY ONE PARTY, FIRST MADE ABOUT TWO 
YEARS AFTER THE FENCE WAS PLACED, RESISTED AND DENIED TO BE 
OWING BY THE OTHER, WITH THE PROBLEM UNRESOLVED AND EXTENDING 
OVER A PERIOD OF SOME TWENTY YEARS, PRECLUDES THE APPLICATION 
OF THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE. 
Until the lawsuit was filed in this instance it does 
not appear that the respondents or their predecessors ever con-
tended that the fence was not a boundary line. 
Some two years after the line was agreed upon by the 
then record owners of the adjacent lands, the son of the ori-
ginal owner commenced trying to collect some money for the land 
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in question. No one ever paid him any money for the land, nor 
did they ever agree that any money was due or owing. He quit 
trying to collect in 1963. 
Aside from on several occasions trying to collect some 
money, the respondents and their predecessors did nothing to claim 
the land in question or to reclaim the same for over 22 years. 
This Court has said that it is basic and sound legal philosophy 
that at some time or another the claimant may not disturb an 
ancient and continuous employment of the property without affirma-
tive objection, albeit the record owner claims previously to have 
been the owner thereof. King v. Fronk, supra. 
The boundary line in this case was established by agree-
ment between the then record owners. Blanchard v. Smith/ 123 
Utah 119, 255 P(2) 729. 
POINT V 
THE DECISION APPEARS TO INTRODUCE A NEW ELEMENT INTO THE DOCTRINE 
OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE IN THAT IT RECITES THAT "THE DEFEN-
DANTS HAVE USED THE LAND IN QUESTION, BUT HAVE NEVER PAID ANY 
TAXES THEREON." THAT TAXES ARE OR MIGHT BE A PROBLEM IN BOUNDARY 
BY ACQUIESCENCE CASES HAS NEVER BEEN A FACTOR IN ANY OF THE PRIOR 
CASES. :.,:_.;,,-.'-, .,,,:_,-,.• .;. ." 
Unlike an adverse possessor, a claimant under boundary 
by acquiescence is not required to pay taxes on or improve the 
disputed land. King v. Fronk, supra, and see Boundary by Ac-
quiescence, 3 Utah Law Review 504 N.l (1953). 
CONCLUSION 
The Decision entered on November 5, 1975, should be 
reconsidered by the Court and a new decision should be entered 
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reversing the decision of the trial court and directing that a 
judgment be entered in favor of the appellants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLAIR M. ALDRICH 
ALDRICH & NELSON 
43 East 200 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Tel: 373-4912 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Appellants 
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